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about the results of the C. V .A. performed 
on the victim. Appellant. and the fetuS. At 
the hearing. Dr. Olson testified that medi-
cal genetics is the study of diseases associ-
ated with inherited characteristics and that 
cytogenetics is a subspecialty concen-
trating on chromosome structures and 
abnormalities. The doctor explained that 
C.V.A. is a process through which cyto-
geneticists look at chromosome variants. 
Id. at 241. 533 A.2d at 948. Where paterni-
ty is in dispute. as it was before this court. 
the variants of the child are compared to 
that of the mother's, determining which 
chromosomes the mother contributed. 
The child's remaining chromosomes are 
then compared to the alleged father. H any 
of the child's variants matches a variant of 
the father. then the man could have con-
tributed all of the chromosomes. but if 
there is no match then the man is excluded 
from paternity. Id. . 
At Appellant's second trial. Dr. Olson 
was allowed to testify that C.V.A. showed 
that the non-maternal (alleged father's) 
variants of the fetuS all matched the 
variants exhibited by Appellant's chromo-
somes. Hence. it was highly unlikely that 
anyone else had the same variants as 
Appellant. Id. at 244. 533 A.2d at 950. 
The court of special appeals was not sat-
isfied. however. that C.V.A. had been gen-
erally accepted as reliable in the relevant 
scientific community. and therefore. the 
State failed to meet its burden under the 
Frye-Reed test. In support 'Of their finding 
Inseparable buddies who were alike in everything save one; one learned , 
to stand and walk with the help of his mom and dad, the other with the help 
of Easter Seals, and of course a best friend who never let a disability stand in 
the way of friendship. Give to Easter Seals. Give the power to overcome. • 
the court took special note of the fact that 
Dr. Olson failed to produce any journal 
articles or textbooks which showed that 
C.V.A. is believed to be as reliable in pater-
nity cases as she asserts and failed to name 
any of the other cytogeneticists she claim-
ed share her views. Id. As a result. the 
court reversed Appellant's conviction and 
on remand the State would not be permit-
ted to introduce evidence which was based 
upon C.V.A. The court. however. limited 
its holding by stating that the use of cyto-
genetic evidence "is subject to reconsidera-
tion in future cases if evidence can be 
produced showing that C.V.A. is generally 
accepted as reliable in establishing paterni-
ty:' Id. at 245. 533 A.2d at 951. 
The prosecution faces many difficulties 
when attempting to prove the guilt of an 
alleged rapist. In Cobey. the court has con-
tributed to this already difficult process by 
excluding reliable and possibly deter-
minative evidence. Reliability should be 
based on the degree of accuracy and not on 
the number of articles or textbooks that 
have been written in response to the pro-
posed subject matter. 
-Deborah Dykstra 
Martin 'I'J. State: TRIAL JUDGE MUST 
ThWORMPRO~D~ANT 
mAT HE CANNOT BE FORCED 
TO TESTIFY 
In Martin '1'1. State. 73 Md. App. 597. 535 
A.2d 951 (1988). the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland established the scope 
and limits of the duty owed by a trial court 
to a pro se criminal defendant. The court 
held that when a criminal defendant 
chooses to proceed to trial without the 
assistance of counsel. it is inrumbent upon 
the trial judge to inform the defendant that 
he cannot be forced to testify and that his 
failure to testify cannot be used against 
him. Once these warnings are given. how-
ever. and the defendant nevertheless elects 
to take the witness stand on his own 
behalf. the court is under no obligation to 
inform him that he may be subject to 
cross-examination and impeachment. 
Appellant. Thomas Eugene Martin. was 
arrested and charged for unlawful posses-
sion of controlled paraphernalia after a 
hypodermic syringe was discovered in a 
pickup truck he had been driving. Martin 
waived his right to counsel and chose to 
proceed pro se in a jury trial in the Circuit 
Court for Washington County. After the 
State concluded the presentation of its 
case. the trial judge informed Martin that 
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he had a right to testify but that he was 
under no obligation to do so. Addition-
ally, the defendant was told that if he did 
not testify, it would not be held against 
him. 
Determined t') speak in his own defense, 
Martin took the stand and offered his side 
of the story. Martin stated that he was 
"helping a friend move some furniture and 
was unaware that the syringe was in the 
truck." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 952-53. On 
cross-examination, the prosecution at-
tempted to impeach Martin's credibility 
by revealing a prior conviction for the 
possession of marijuana with the intent to 
distribute. Apparently unpersuaded by 
Martin's testimony, the jury found him 
guilty and the court sentenced him to four 
years in prison. 
On appeal, the issue was whether the 
advice and warning given were so inade-
quate in apprising the appellant of his fIfth 
amendment right against self-
incrimination that a prejudicial error was 
committed. Martin contended that hiS 
right against self-incrimination was vio-
lated because his election to testify was not 
based on a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
Specifically, he argued that as a pro se 
defendant, the trial court had a duty to 
inform him that "(1) if he took the witness 
stand, he could be impeached, and (2) the 
jury would be instructed as to the pre-
sumption of innocence if he elected not to 
testify." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 953. Thus, 
the more narrow question was whether 
the lack of such knowledge deprived the 
defendant of his ability to make an inform-
ed and intelligent waiver of his right 
against self-incrimination. 
The court of special appeals viewed the 
issue presented as one which essentially 
involved a question of balancing a pro se 
criminal defendant's right to be sufficient-
ly informed and the need to avoid impos-
ing an onerous burden on the trial court. 
Thus, while it is necessary to provide an 
unrepresented defendant with sufficient 
. advice to insure that an election to testify 
is voluntary and informed, the trial judge 
has no obligation to serve as defense coun-
sel. As noted, "[tlhe question then 
becomes, how much should the court say? 
How far should the court go?" Id. at 601, 
535 A.2d at 953. 
In Ste'Oens '0. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d 
73 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 886 (1963), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland recog-
nized that "[mlost jurisdictions ... have 
held that failure by a trial court to advise 
a defendant not represented by counsel of 
his right to refuse to take the witness stand 
constitutes prejudicial error." Id. at 39,192 
A.2d at 77 (citing 79 A.L.R. 2d 643 (1961) 
and cases therein). The reason this require-
ment is imposed upon the trial court is to 
protect a defendant's ftfth amendment 
right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination. As stated in State '0. McKen· 
zie, 17 Md. App. 563, 593, 303 A.2d 406, 
422 (1973), unrepresented "[dlefendants 
should not be called to the stand by the 
prosecutor or the judge; nor should they 
be led to believe that they are required or 
expected to take the stand." 
Thus, to call a pro se defendant to the 
witness stand without informing him of 
his right to refuse to testify constitutes 
reversible error. To avoid such error, it is 
essential that the defendant waive his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Further-
more, in that the privilege against 
self-incrimination is a fundamental consti-
tutional right, the waiver must be a know-
ing and intentional one. Johnson '0. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Curtis '0. State, 
284 Md. 132, 143, 395 A.2d 464, 470 
(1978). The gist of the Johnson rule is that 
for a waiver to be valid, the defendant 
must be reasonably aware of what protec-
tion the right involves and must voluntari-
ly choose to forego that protection. It is 
clear then, that when a defendant chooses 
to testify on his own behalf, he waives his 
fIfth amendment right only if he has suffi-
cient knowledge as to the meaning of such 
a wavier. Without sufficient knowledge, 
the defendant cannot make a voluntary 
and intelligent decision to forego the pro-
tection and safeguards afforded by the 
right. Thus, where a defendant is not 
assisted by counsel, it is incumbent upon 
the court to insure that his decision to tes-
tify is an informed and voluntary one. 
In the instant case, the trial judge simply 
informed the defendant that he had a right 
to remain silent and that if he chose to 
exercise that right, it would not be held 
against him. The court of special appeals 
afftrmed the lower court and refused to 
require that pro se defendants should be 
warned of the perils of cross-examination 
and impeachment. In order to address 
both the interests and rights of pro se 
defendants and the obligations imposed 
upon a trial judge, the court concluded 
that a minimum amount of advice was all 
that was required. The court explained its 
holding as follows: 
Trial judges are commanded by both 
Constitutionally-based case law and 
spedftc rules of procedure (see Md. 
Rule 4-215) to inform unrepresented 
defendants of their right to counsel, to 
encourage them to obtain counsel, and 
to warn them of the hazards of pro-
ceeding without counsel. H a defen-
dant knowingly and voluntarily elects 
to disregard that advice and proceed 
without counsel, he cannot expect the 
judge to become his lawyer. Informing 
him that he has a right not to testify 
and that no inference of guilt can be 
drawn if he exercises that right suf-
ftces, we think, to allow him to make 
an intelligent-if not a wise-decision 
whether to testify • To go further, how-
ever, might involve the court, however 
subtle, in influencing that decision. 
Martin, at 603,535 A.2d at 954. 
The information which a trial judge 
must provide to a pro se defendant is now 
clear. Once the minimum required warn-
ings are given, however, the unrepresented 
defendant who elects to take the stand will 
be deemed to have voluntarily executed a 
valid waiver of his right against compulso-
ry self-incrimination. 
-Gerard M. Waites 
Prout v. State: WITNESS' PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS OF CRIMES 
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE 
NOT ADMISsmLE FOR 
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES 
In Prout '0. State, 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 
445 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that prior convictions of a 
witness may be admissible for impeach-
ment purposes only if the conviction was 
for either an infamous crime or a lesser 
IFJRrn rnw (0) JM 
IFJR(Q)JM 
~JM (Q)OCIIN CG® 
A Unique Program 
To Help You Conquer The 
Cigarette Habit 





® OF MARYLAND 
The Christmas Seal peopl: 
1301 York Road, Suite 705 
Lutherville, Maryland 21093 
(301) 494-1100 or 1-800-492-7527 
------------------------------------------------------------------1&3ITheLawForum-39 
